# PUBLIC SPENDING, BY THE PEOPLE

Participatory Budgeting in the United States and Canada in 2014–15

In partnership with local participatory budgeting evaluators and practitioners

Supported by the **Democracy Fund** and the Rita Allen Foundation

Completed through a research partnership with the Kettering **Foundation** 

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## Public Spending, by the People: Participatory Budgeting in the United States and Canada in 2014–15

A report from Public Agenda by Carolin Hagelskamp, Chloe Rinehart, Rebecca Silliman and David Schleifer and in partnership with local participatory budgeting evaluators and practitioners.

Supported by the Democracy Fund and the Rita Allen Foundation and completed through a research partnership with the Kettering Foundation.

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# PUBLIC SPENDING, BY THE PEOPLE

Participatory Budgeting in the United States and Canada in 2014–15

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# RESEARCH PARTNERS

Much of the data and insights summarized in this report were collected and shared by evaluators and practitioners of participatory budgeting across many cities in the United States and Canada, many of whom have published detailed research reports on participatory budgeting in their cities and towns (see "Related Publications by Public Agenda and Participatory Budgeting Evaluators" on page 66). Public Agenda's research team thanks the following individuals for their invaluable contributions that made this publication possible.

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# **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Participatory budgeting (PB) is among the fastest-growing democratic innovations in the United States and Canada. Stakeholders across the political and civic sectors are keeping a keen eye on PB and what it could mean for democracy.

A total of 46 jurisdictions across 13 cities in the U.S. and Canada undertook PB between July 2014 and June 2015.¹ During that time, public officials allocated nearly US\$50 million to PB projects.² Over 70,000 residents participated and more than 350 projects won public funding. Only six years earlier, just one council ward in Chicago and a large public housing community in Toronto were doing PB.

This report provides an unprecedented summary of key facts and figures of the 2014–15 PB cycle in the U.S. and Canada. It highlights the size and scope of PB in 2014–15 and illustrates substantial variability in how communities implemented and participated in PB. With this publication, we seek to inform and significantly further ongoing debates about and practices of PB in the U.S. and Canada.

### How does PB work?

In current forms of PB in the U.S. and Canada, residents of a city or a city council district have the opportunity to directly participate in government decision making by deciding how designated parts of the public budget should be spent.<sup>3</sup> PB typically progresses through four consecutive phases:



#### **IDEA COLLECTION PHASE**

First, residents submit project ideas through a series of public meetings and online.



#### **BUDGET DELEGATE PHASE**

Second, residents volunteer to work in groups to turn ideas into actual project proposals.



### **VOTING PHASE**

Third, fully developed project ideas are put on a ballot for residents—including youth and noncitizens—to vote on.



#### **IMPLEMENTATION PHASE**

Fourth, projects that get the most votes, and fall within the cap of allocated funds, win. Government commits to implementing winning projects.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> This report focuses on participatory budgeting processes that are implemented by a city council, a council member or a city agency. It does not include other types of PB processes, such as those implemented by colleges and schools. The Participatory Budgeting Project estimates that three public high schools and one community college in the United States implemented PB in 2014–15 to allow students to decide how to spend parts of the budget(s) of their schools and college.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This excludes a small 2014-15 process held by the District of Tofino, British Columbia, Canada that the Public Agenda research team unfortunately only found out about after the analyses were completed and the report written.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For all analyses and reporting, we converted Canadian dollars to U.S. dollars to allow for aggregation and comparisons.

# Methodology in Brief

Findings in this report are based on data collected and shared with Public Agenda by local PB evaluation teams across the U.S. and Canada. Public Agenda has been collaborating with local evaluators since early 2015 to facilitate shared learning across communities and to collectively tell the story of PB across the U.S. and Canada.

Our data compilation was guided by a framework of 15 key metrics that Public Agenda developed based on the experiences of local evaluators and the advice of the North American PB Research Board—a group of local evaluators, public engagement practitioners and U.S.- and Canada-based academic researchers who have researched the effects of PB in other countries—along with input from the nonprofit organization the Participatory Budgeting Project. These 15 key metrics specify data points about PB implementation, participation and winning projects that are important for a better understanding of the current state of PB, the tracking of its immediate outputs and the clarification of its potential long-term impacts. To read more about the 15 key metrics for evaluating participatory budgeting, go to: http://www.publicagenda.org/pages/research-and-evaluation-of-participatory-budgeting-in-the-us-and-canada.



# PART 1: WHAT HAPPENED? FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT HOW PB WAS IMPLEMENTED

How exactly did communities implement PB? How did communities differ from one another in their adaptation of PB to local needs and resources? And how successful were different council districts and cities in getting the word out and encouraging residents to take part?

### **Key findings:**

- More than half of the 2014–15 PB communities were undertaking PB for the first time.
- Officials allocated on average \$1 million to a PB process (nearly always capital funds only), ranging from \$61,000 to over \$3 million.
- In all PB communities, residents under 18 years old were eligible to vote. The minimum voting age was most commonly 14 or 16.
- More than 8,000 residents brainstormed community needs in more than 240 neighborhood idea collection assemblies. In communities that held more neighborhood idea collection assemblies, total participation across assemblies was higher.
- Over 1,000 resident volunteers turned ideas into viable proposals as budget delegates. Some communities did not offer residents opportunities to become budget delegates, and one reported as many as 75 such volunteers.
- Nearly all communities used online and digital tools to tell residents about PB. Far fewer did targeted person-to-person outreach. Person-to-person outreach was associated with greater participation of traditionally marginalized communities.
- 140 partnerships between community-based organizations (CBOs) and government formed to increase participation in PB. CBO outreach was associated with higher representation of traditionally marginalized communities at the vote.
- More than 70,000 residents cast ballots across nearly 400 voting sites and more than 300 voting days. Some communities brought out fewer than 200 voters, others more than 3,000.
- A total of 360 projects won PB funding.

# PART 2: WHO PARTICIPATED? THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF VOTER SURVEY RESPONDENTS

What do we know about the demographics of PB voters? How representative were PB voters of their local communities? How successful were communities in engaging groups that are often marginalized from the political process?

# **Key findings:**

- AGE: Residents under 18 years old and seniors were overrepresented among survey respondents in many communities, while residents between 18 and 44 years of age were underrepresented. Overall, 11 percent of respondents were under 18 years of age.
- RACE/ETHNICITY: In nearly all communities, black residents were overrepresented or represented proportionally to the local census among voter survey respondents. Hispanics were underrepresented among survey respondents in most PB sites. Overall, blacks made up 21 percent of respondents and Hispanics made up 21 percent of respondents.
- INCOME: In most communities, residents from lower-income households were overrepresented or represented proportionally to the local census among voter survey respondents. Overall, 27 percent of respondents reported annual household incomes of less than \$25,000 and 19 percent reported annual household incomes between \$25,000 and \$49,000.
- EDUCATION: Residents with less formal education were underrepresented among voter survey respondents in most communities. Just 39 percent of respondents overall reported not having a college degree.
- **GENDER**: Women were overrepresented among voter survey respondents in nearly all PB communities. Overall, 62 percent of respondents were women.

# PART 3: WHAT GOT FUNDED? BALLOTS AND WINNING PROJECTS

What kinds of projects made it on the ballot? What types of projects received the largest amount of PB allocations? And what kinds of projects were most and least likely to win residents' votes?

## **Key findings:**

- Parks and recreation projects were the most common ballot items overall, followed by school projects. But ballots varied substantially—some included no parks and recreation or no school projects.
- Overall, schools received the largest share (33 percent) of PB-allocated funds.
- Public safety projects were rare on ballots but had a high chance of winning.
- Public housing projects were rare on ballots and had a low chance of winning.

# QUESTIONS FOR NATIONAL AND LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS

We hope this publication will stimulate national and local discussion about PB and its potential to positively impact individuals, communities and governments across the U.S. and Canada. The report therefore concludes with some important questions for national and local stakeholders who are debating PB's current state and potential impacts, are working on refining its implementation or are conducting further research and evaluations. Following are these questions in brief.

### Questions about PB's potential to spread and scale:

- With an average of \$1 million allocated in each PB community, what can be achieved?
- How do communities support and finance the implementation of PB, and how sustainable are these strategies?
- What community conditions facilitate or hinder successful implementation of PB?

#### Questions about implementation:

- What are the various goals local communities have for PB, and how are they communicated?
- What is the quality of deliberation—when and how do residents consider the trade-offs of various community needs and projects?
- How do online and digital tools for outreach and engagement affect who participates and what gets funded?
- As communities vary in voting rules and ballot design, how does that impact voting patterns?

### Questions about participation:

- Why are some communities better than others at engaging traditionally marginalized populations?
- What are the characteristics and motivations of residents who submit project ideas and volunteer as budget delegates?
- How do PB participation rates and participant demographics compare with those in other types of local civic and political engagement?

## Questions about ballot items and winning projects:

- What do we know about the processes by which projects make it on the ballot?
- How do money allocations in PB differ from those that are happening without PB?

## Questions about long-term impacts:

- What exactly may be PB's key long-term impacts on the health of U.S. and Canadian communities?
- Are there long-term impacts on the civic skills, attitudes and behaviors of participants?
- Does PB lead to more equitable distribution of resources?
- How does PB affect government decision making outside of the PB process?



# INTRODUCTION

Participatory budgeting (PB) is among the fastest-growing democratic innovations in the United States and Canada. Over the course of 2015 and 2016, residents in at least 60 communities will decide how portions of public money should be spent to improve their neighborhoods and cities. Six years ago, only one ward in Chicago and a community housing development in Toronto were putting public money to a direct vote for residents. Not surprisingly, stakeholders across the political and civic sectors are keeping a keen eye on PB and what it could mean for democracy: Can PB improve communities? Does it build trust between residents and government? Do participants develop greater civic skills? And does it lead to more equitable distributions of resources?

This report presents key facts and figures of the 2014–15 PB cycle in the U.S. and Canada. It highlights the size and scope of PB in 2014–15 and illustrates substantial variability in how communities implemented and participated in PB. With this publication, we seek to inform and further ongoing debates about and practices of PB in the U.S. and Canada.

# How does participatory budgeting work?

In current forms of PB in the U.S. and Canada, residents of a city or a city council district have the opportunity to directly participate in government decision making by deciding how specific parts of the public budget should be spent.

These PB processes typically start with a public official or a city council publicly designating a set amount of its budget to PB. In the majority of cases, a steering committee—comprising local community groups, community leaders, government representatives and others—forms to decide on the goals and the rules of the process. These may include establishing the minimum voting age and other eligibility criteria, the timeline, resource allocations, targets for outreach and participation, roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders and so forth. The steering committee typically writes a rule book and meets throughout the process to monitor its implementation.

While communities vary in how exactly they implement PB, the process typically comprises a number of distinct phases, each progressing over a period of several weeks and months.



#### **IDEA COLLECTION PHASE**

First, residents come together in public meetings and online to discuss community needs and brainstorm ideas for projects that could be financed with the money their public representatives allocated to the PB process.



#### **BUDGET DELEGATE PHASE**

Second, resident volunteers work in groups (or committees) to further develop the initial ideas into actual project proposals. These volunteers (commonly called *budget delegates*) typically work closely with relevant city agencies to assess the feasibility and cost of projects.



#### **VOTING PHASE**

Third, fully developed project ideas are put on a ballot for residents—including youth and noncitizens—to vote on. The voting period often lasts several days.



#### **IMPLEMENTATION PHASE**

Fourth, projects that get the most votes, and fall within the cap of allocated funds, win Government commits to implementing winning projects.<sup>4</sup>

## How has PB grown across the U.S. and Canada?

PB started in Brazil in the late 1980s and has since spread to over 1,500 communities across the world. In Canada, Toronto Community Housing—the second-largest public housing authority in North America—first started a PB process among their housing residents in 2001 and has continued to do so annually. The first PB process in the U.S. did not take hold until 2009, when then (and current) alderman Joe Moore of the 49th Ward in Chicago brought it to his constituents, with support from the Participatory Budgeting Project. In the first year, Alderman Moore allocated \$1.3 million of discretionary infrastructure funds (called menu money in Chicago) to PB. A steering committee of 40 community leaders oversaw the implementation of the process. Over 100 people volunteered to be budget delegates, 36 projects made it on the ballot, more than 1,600 residents came out to vote and 14 projects won. Alderman Moore has not only continued the process in the 49th Ward every year since but has also become a vocal PB advocate, educating council members and colleagues around the country and encouraging them to bring PB to their communities.

<sup>6</sup> Participedia, "Chicago Participatory Budgeting Project," Participedia.net (2014), http://participedia.net/en/cases/chicago-participatory-budgeting-project.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In this work, we consider only those participatory budgeting processes that include a public vote and where officials committed to spending funds in accordance to that vote. We are not considering budgeting processes that are consultative in the sense that residents are given opportunities to weigh in on how public money should be spent, but where there is no official public vote.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Gianpaolo Baiocchi and Ernesto Ganuza, "Participatory Budgeting as if Emancipation Mattered," Politics & Society 42, no. 1 (2014): 29–50; Josh Lerner, Everyone Counts: Could "Participatory Budgeting" Change Democracy? (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).

Since 2009, an increasing number of city council districts have started experimenting with PB. In 2012, Vallejo, California, was the first city to implement citywide PB, joined in 2014 by Cambridge, Massachusetts; Hinton, Alberta, Canada; and Saint-Basile-le-Grand, Quebec, Canada. Also in 2014, Boston launched the first youth PB process, which focuses on Bostonians ages 12 to 25. One district in Long Beach, California, and most recently the city of Seattle, Washington, followed suit with youth-only PB experiments. The timeline in Box 1 illustrates the growth of PB in the cities and council districts across the U.S. and Canada since 2009.

# What are the promises of PB?

Participatory budgeting means a fundamental shift in traditional government decision making. Ordinary residents decide through a series of deliberative processes and a direct vote how public money is spent. Political theorists and practitioners argue that this shift could have long-term impacts on people, communities and government.<sup>7</sup>

Among the greatest promises of PB is its potential to:

- Empower residents—especially those who are marginalized from traditional politics to make impactful decisions, acquire civic skills and knowledge and stay politically engaged beyond their involvement in PB.
- Lead to a more equitable distribution of resources and to public decisions that better align with community needs.
- Increase transparency in public spending, build trust between government and residents and increase the legitimacy of public decisions.
- Foster collaborations between and among public and nonprofit stakeholders and build a stronger civic infrastructure.


All these outcomes are, arguably, indicators and elements of better democracy that are ultimately expected to make communities healthier, happier and more prosperous.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See Gianpaolo Biaocchi, "The Porto Alegre Experiment and Deliberative Democratic Theory," *Politics & Society* 29 (2001): 43–72; Archon Fung, "Putting the Public Back into Governance: The Challenges of Citizen Participation and Its Future," *Public Administration Review* 75, no. 4 (2015): 513–22; Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: *Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance*, vol. 4 (London: Verso, 2003); Celina Su, "Whose Budget? Our Budget? Broadening Political Stakeholdership via Participatory Budgeting," *Journal of Public Deliberation* 8, no. 2 (2012): 1–14; Carolina Johnson and John Gastil, "Variations of Institutional Design for Empowered Deliberation," *Journal of Public Deliberation* 11, no. 1 (2015): 1–32; Hollie Russon Gilman, *Democracy Reinvented: Participatory Budgeting and Civic Innovation in America* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016); Lerner, *Everyone Counts*, 2014.

### How do communities research and evaluate PB?

Soon after PB took hold in U.S. and Canadian communities, local research and evaluation teams formed in a number of those communities to study how participatory budgeting was implemented, who participated in it, what types of projects made it on the ballot and which won funding. These local evaluations are typically designed to address specific goals set forth by a local steering committee and to help implementers learn from their own experiences and improve the implementation over time. At the beginning of this report, we list the names of evaluators and researchers who collected data on PB processes in 2014–15.

The U.S. and Canadian PB research and evaluation field is moving toward studying the longer-term promises PB holds for people, communities and government (as previously outlined). However, for a number of reasons it is still too early to show robust research findings on PB's long-term impacts. For one thing, PB is still new in these communities, most of whom experienced PB in the 2014–15 cycle for the first time. Second, and related, communities are still experimenting with how to best do PB given their local goals, needs and culture. One would expect that a shift in governance as fundamental as PB would need to be implemented for a few years and done well in order to have a chance at showing its potential long-term effects on communities. Third, the amount of PB-allocated dollars is still relatively small (especially compared with cities in South America, where research has shown significant positive community-level improvement with PB)<sup>8</sup> and in nearly all cases restricted to physical infrastructure projects. Many PB stakeholders argue that much more money and diverse budgets are needed for PB to bring positive long-term change to U.S. and Canadian cities and towns.<sup>9</sup>



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Brian Wampler, Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation, and Accountability (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).

<sup>10</sup> Participatory Budgeting Project, "Participatory Budgeting in North America 2014–2015: A Year of Growth" (Brooklyn, NY: PBP, 2015).



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Celina Su, "Participatory Budgeting in New York City," *Metropolitics* 1 (2014), http://www.metropolitiques.eu/Participatory-Budgeting-in-New.html; Madeleine Pape and Josh Lerner, "Budgeting for Equity: How Can Participatory Budgeting Advance Equity in the United States?" (manuscript in preparation, 2016); Carolin Hagelskamp, "On Participatory Budgeting and Democracy, We Need Patience, Research and Clear Goals," *On the Agenda blog*, March 1, 2016, http://www.publicagenda.org/blogs/on-participatory-budgeting-and-democracy-we-need-patience-research-and-clear-goals.

# THIS RESEARCH

The 2014–15 cycle of PB in the U.S. and Canada is the focus of this report. Our analyses highlight the size and scope of PB for that cycle and illustrate variability in how communities implement and participate in PB. These analyses make a much-needed and timely contribution to our understanding of PB. They raise questions of theory and practice and provide essential baseline data that will further long-term impact evaluations of PB. With this publication, we seek to inform local and national conversations about PB and its future. We also seek to set the stage for further research and writings by others and ourselves about PB.

This report brings together the invaluable and hard work of local evaluation teams and local PB practitioners who have been conducting research in individual PB communities and cities during the 2014–15 cycle of PB in the U.S. and Canada. Public Agenda has been collaborating with local evaluators and practitioners since early 2015 to facilitate shared learning across communities and to be able to collectively tell a story of PB across the U.S. and Canada.

For our first year of data collection, the goal was to compile and compare key pieces of information about PB related to: 1) the implementation of processes that had a vote between July 2014 and June 2015, 2) participants in these processes and 3) the projects that made it on the ballots in these PB communities.

Specifically, we sought to provide answers to questions such as the following:

- What was the scale of PB in the U.S. and Canada in the 2014–15 cycle? How was PB implemented, and how much did communities vary in how they implemented PB?
- Who participated in PB in 2014–15? How representative were PB participants of their local communities? How much did communities differ in their engagement of groups that are traditionally marginalized from the political process?
- What types of projects won PB votes in 2014–15? Across what range of projects did PB money get allocated?

Our data collection effort was guided by a framework of 15 key metrics that we had developed based on the experiences of local evaluators and the advice of the North American PB Research Board—a group of local evaluators, public engagement practitioners and U.S.- and Canada-based academic researchers who have researched the effects of PB in other countries around the world—along with input from the nonprofit organization the Participatory Budgeting Project. These 15 key metrics specify data points about PB implementation, participation and winning projects that are important for a better understanding of the current state of PB, the tracking of its immediate outputs and the clarification of its potential long-term impacts.

## Which PB sites are included in this report?

This report includes data from all cities or council districts that had a PB vote between July 2014 and June 2015. We counted a total of 46 such sites; 89 percent were in the U.S., 11 percent in Canada. Box 2 shows a map with locations of all 46 PB sites in 2014–15. For a full list of these 46 PB sites and the names of public officials and agencies that undertook them, see page 63.

The vast majority of these communities undertook PB on the district level of a city (85 percent). That means a city council member decided to allocate parts of a given budget to PB. All district residents, including residents younger than 18 years of age and noncitizens, were eligible to participate. District-level PB in 2014–15 happened in 24 council districts in New York City; 4 neighborhoods in San Juan, Puerto Rico; 4 council wards in Chicago; 2 council districts in Long Beach, California; 2 council districts in San Francisco, California; 1 council ward in St. Louis, Missouri; and 2 council districts in Halifax, Nova Scotia.


In addition, four cities implemented PB citywide in 2014–15. In these cases, a city council and a mayor voted together to allocate some part of the city budget to PB. All city residents, including residents younger than 18 years of age and noncitizens, were eligible to participate. Such citywide PB happened in Vallejo, California; Cambridge, Massachusetts; Hinton, Alberta; and Saint-Basile-le-Grand, Quebec.

In two cases, PB was designed exclusively for and by youth and young adults. In those "youth processes," an elected official—for instance, a mayor or a city council member—decided to allocate parts of a specified budget to a PB process that focused on youth engagement and limited participation to residents between 12 and 25 years of age (Boston) or residents between 11 and 18 years of age (Long Beach, California, District 3). Finally, the Toronto Community Housing PB process was designed for residents in 13 building groups and coordinated by Toronto Community Housing, a nonprofit social housing provider wholly owned by the city of Toronto.

All 46 PB communities are treated as separate sites in the current analyses. That is because each had its own PB budget allocation, its own ballot and its own community of residents. However, not all sites were equally independent of one another. Most notable, the 24 New York City districts shared one citywide steering committee and followed one rule book. In Chicago, three PB wards shared a citywide steering committee and a rule book. The four processes in San Juan, Puerto Rico, were all initiated by the same public official, but in distinct neighborhoods. Moreover, Toronto Community Housing PB is considered one PB site in the current analyses, even though it was technically a conglomerate of 13 individual PB processes—1 for each building group, and each with its own budget allocation, ballot and community of residents.

This report summarizes data across all 46 sites, where available. When relevant data are missing, we note throughout the precise number of sites our estimates are based on. We also note the few instances in which we decided to exclude a site or more from an analysis because it constituted too much of an outlier and would have biased the analysis.

To learn more about our research methodology, including how various data were collected, coded and analyzed, and about limitations of the research, see "Methodology" at the end of this report.





# MAIN FINDINGS



# What Happened? Facts and Figures About How PB Was Implemented

Between the summers of 2014 and 2015, residents in 46 jurisdictions across 13 cities in the United States and Canada voted on how public money should be spent. Public officials allocated nearly \$50 million to PB projects. Over 70,000 residents participated, and more than 350 projects won.

How exactly did communities implement PB? What happened at each stage of these processes? How did communities differ from one another in their adaptation of PB to local needs and resources? And how successful were different council districts and cities in getting the word out and encouraging residents to take part?

# **Key findings:**

- More than half of 2014–15 PB communities were undertaking PB for the first time.
- Officials allocated on average \$1 million to a PB process (nearly always capital funds only), ranging from \$61,000 to over \$3 million.
- In all PB communities, residents under 18 years old were eligible to vote. The minimum voting age was most commonly 14 or 16.
- More than 8,000 residents brainstormed community needs in more than 240 neighborhood idea collection assemblies. In communities that held more neighborhood idea collection assemblies, total participation across assemblies was higher.
- Over 1,000 resident volunteers turned ideas into viable proposals as budget delegates. Some communities did not offer residents opportunities to become budget delegates, and one reported as many as 75 such volunteers.
- Nearly all communities used online and digital tools to tell residents about PB.
   Far fewer did targeted person-to-person outreach. Person-to-person outreach was associated with greater participation of traditionally marginalized communities.
- 140 partnerships between community-based organizations (CBOs) and government formed to increase participation in PB. CBO outreach was associated with higher representation of traditionally marginalized communities at the vote.
- More than 70,000 residents cast ballots across nearly 400 voting sites and more than 300 voting days. Some communities brought out fewer than 200 voters, others more than 3,000.
- A total of 360 projects won PB funding.



In this first part of the report, we summarize aggregated data from across the 46 communities that undertook PB in 2014–15 (with a vote between July 2014 and June 2015). We highlight the size and scope of activities in each phase of these PB processes. We also show that PB communities varied greatly in the way they implement PB, including in the amount of money officials allocated, in the way they reached out to invite residents to participate, in the numbers of events and voting opportunities that were held and in immediate outcomes such as the numbers of participants in each phase and the numbers of funded projects.

There are many likely reasons why communities differ in their implementations and outcomes of PB. For one, PB is a locally grounded democratic process that by definition should be adapted to local needs. Despite sharing some common goals—such as seeking to increase civic engagement, making government more transparent and building better relations between residents and elected officials—communities vary in their aspirations and emphases when adopting PB. Some communities are more explicit than others in seeking particularly to include residents who are traditionally marginalized from the political process. Some focus exclusively on youth engagement. Relatedly, there are various ways in which PB gets initiated. In most recent cases in the U.S. and Canada, officials themselves learned about PB and decided independently to introduce it to their districts or cities. But in some cases, residents and community groups have advocated for it. Moreover, communities vary greatly in the resources they have available for the implementation of PB. Some public officials run the process with just one staff member, others receive city-level support. Some processes are supported through foundation funding and are able to bring in external technical assistance. Finally, PB implementers—that is, city and district officials and staff, community groups and resident volunteers—vary in their public engagement expertise and their overall commitment to the process.

For these and other reasons, we are not surprised to see substantial variation in PB implementation, participation and funded projects across communities. Our goal here is to illustrate such variation and as such provide evidence to inform deeper local and national conversations (and analysis) about the various forms PB has taken across the U.S. and Canada.

# Participatory Budgeting 2014-15 in the U.S. and Canada: In Numbers



<sup>5</sup> 35 processes.

57% of communities in 2014—15 were doing PB for the first time.


# Over half of communities were undertaking PB for the first time.

Of the 46 communities that implemented PB in 2014–15, 26 (57 percent) did so for the first time. Another 10 (22 percent) were implementing PB for the second consecutive year. Eight communities (17 percent) were in their third or fourth round of PB implementation. Chicago alderman Joe Moore—the first public official to bring PB to the U.S.—implemented his sixth consecutive cycle of PB in Chicago's 49th Ward, and Toronto Community Housing PB was in its 12th year.

In nearly all communities, officials allocated only capital funds to PB—funds that are specifically earmarked for projects to improve physical infrastructure. But officials differed substantially in how much money they allocated to PB projects.

PB was most typically initiated by a single local official with access to sufficient amounts of discretionary funds to make a PB experiment worthwhile (70 percent of PB initiatives were funded this way). In interviews with Public Agenda, officials commonly said that they had heard about PB from other public officials and were intrigued enough to try it in their communities. Their discretionary funds were the obvious source to independently experiment with PB.<sup>11</sup>

Other sources for PB allocations were city capital or city general funds (22 percent) as well as measure B sales taxes, city agency capital funds, tax increment financing programs and capital funds from a city-owned nonprofit organization (total less than 10 percent)—see Figure 1.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Public Agenda conducted a longitudinal qualitative interview study with officials who implemented PB in 2014–15 and/or 2015–16 and officials in adjacent districts or cities who were not implementing PB. Findings from this research will be released in the summer of 2016.



In nearly all cases (89 percent), PB allocations were restricted to capital projects—that is, to projects that help improve physical infrastructure, such as renovating schools, building parks, longer-term technology updates for public or community services and so on. In some cases (11 percent), the allocated budget could be spent on both capital and programmatic projects—the latter including projects that could provide ongoing services, such as funding for a nonprofit to run an after-school program.


allocations to capital projects.

89% of sites

restricted PB

The average amount allocated to PB in 2014–15 was \$1 million, <sup>12</sup> but it ranged from \$61,000 in a first-year pilot program to nearly \$3.4 million in the Toronto Community Housing PB—see Figure 2. The second-highest allocation was \$2.51 million for a districtwide PB program. In not all cases, however, is the amount officials allocate to PB completely at their own discretion. In New York City, for example, the citywide steering committee agreed to a rule that participating city council members needed to allocate at least \$1 million to PB.

Relatedly, PB sites varied substantially in the dollars allocated per resident. On average, officials allocated \$10 per resident, ranging from one community where allocated PB funds translated to \$70 per resident to one where they translated to \$1 per resident<sup>13</sup>—see Figure 2. Several officials told Public Agenda in interviews that they viewed their first PB experience as a pilot initiative but were expecting to allocate more funds over time if they felt PB was a success in their communities.<sup>14</sup>



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Allocations in Canadian PB processes were converted to U.S. dollars to allow for aggregation.

<sup>13 42</sup> processes

<sup>14</sup> Public Agenda conducted a longitudinal qualitative interview study with officials who implemented PB in 2014–15 and/or 2015–16 and officials in adjacent districts or cities who were not implementing PB. Findings from this research will be released in the summer of 2016.

# In all communities, residents under 18 years of age and noncitizens were eligible to vote on PB projects. A few sites had no age restrictions.

In regular 2014–15 PB processes in the U.S., the minimum voting age was typically either 14 or 16. Three Canadian processes had no age restrictions.

Youth-led PB limits participation to young people. Boston implemented its second youth-led PB, which allowed young residents ages 12 to 25 to vote. In Long Beach, California, District 3's youth-led PB, voting was restricted to young people from 11 to 18 years old. Moreover, all PB communities extended voting rights to residents without citizenship.

# PB processes typically lasted 8 months from kickoff to the vote.

The majority of PB processes (52 percent) were designed to occur over the course of about 8 months from the kickoff day for the idea collection phase to the completion of the voting phase. The shortest PB process lasted 2 months and the longest 12 months. Often, local steering committees decide how long the process should last. For example, in New York City, the citywide steering committee decided the length of the process. Consequently, all 24 NYC processes followed the same timeline.



## **IDEA COLLECTION PHASE**

# More than 8,000 residents brainstormed community needs at more than 240 neighborhood idea collection assemblies.

Evaluators and implementers reported a total of 244 neighborhood idea collection assemblies had taken place and brought together an estimated 8,096 residents to brainstorm project ideas in PB communities during the 2014–15 PB cycle.<sup>15</sup>

On average, communities reported having held 6 neighborhood idea collection assemblies, ranging from some communities holding 1 assembly to one community that reported holding 19 assemblies—see Figure  $3.^{16}$  Smaller jurisdictions tended to hold more assemblies per residents than larger ones (correlation r = .48). On average, communities had one assembly per 24,000 residents, ranging from one assembly per just over 4,000 residents in a city of just over 16,000 residents total to one assembly per more than 55,000 residents in a district of over 160,000 residents total. These estimates exclude one PB district that did not have neighborhood idea collection assemblies at all.

More assemblies = more participants across assemblies overall.

On average, 198 residents participated across all neighborhood idea collection assemblies per community, ranging from 20 overall assembly participants to 777 overall assembly participants per community—see Figure  $3.^{18}$  Perhaps not surprising, communities that held more assemblies also tended to report greater overall numbers of participants across all assemblies (correlation r = .82); however, we found much less of a correlation between the number of voting sites a community offered and their overall voter turnout—see page 28.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> 41 processes.




<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> As noted previously, these numbers and others about the implementation of PB are likely underestimations, as we were not able to collect complete data on all data points from all communities. For example, information about the number of neighborhood idea collection assemblies was available from 44 of the 46 PB processes, and information on the number of assembly participants was available from 42 of 46 processes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> 43 processes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> 39 processes.

Finally, communities weren't equally successful in attracting residents through neighborhood idea collection assemblies (and not all assemblies were equally successful at attracting residents). The average assembly turnout per community was 38 people, ranging from a community that averaged 3 attendees per assembly to one that reported an average of 200 attendees per assembly—see Figure 3.<sup>19</sup>

In order to attract more residents, and particularly more diverse residents, to neighborhood idea collection assemblies, PB organizers may also provide transportation support as well as language support, food and child care. In New York City, evaluators estimated that about a third of idea collection assemblies had language support and nearly half provided food, whereas far fewer assemblies provided child care, based on self-reports from district staff.<sup>20</sup>



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> 41 processes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Community Development Project at the Urban Justice Center with the PBNYC Research Team, "A People's Budget: A Research and Evaluation Report on Participatory Budgeting in New York City" (New York: Community Development Project at the Urban Justice Center, 2015), https://cdp.urbanjustice.org/sites/default/files/CDP.WEB.doc\_Report\_ PBNYC\_cycle4findings-district\_20151021.pdf.

# Box 3: What is a PB neighborhood idea collection assembly?

Neighborhood (or community) idea collection assemblies are the traditional method by which PB practitioners engage residents to collect project ideas during the PB idea collection phase. Commonly, these assemblies are announced in advance and invite residents to come together at a space in the neighborhood at a given time and date. They are typically led by the implementation teams, which may include city or district staff as well as representatives from community-based organizations and resident volunteers. The format of the assemblies includes educational and deliberative components. Residents learn basics about the city's budgeting process, are introduced to the PB and then break up into groups, led by facilitators, to brainstorm and discuss project ideas. All ideas are collected and saved by the organizers for the budget delegate phase of the process.

Neighborhood idea collection assemblies may be organized to attract a diverse group of residents or they may be targeted at specific groups, including socially and politically marginalized or otherwise hard-to-reach groups, or they may be focused on specific issue areas, such as public housing, education, arts and culture. In one variety of the targeted neighborhood idea collection assembly, organizers approach community-based organizations or groups (for example, senior centers, LGBT groups, schools) directly to attend an already existing meeting, during which they can introduce PB and collect residents' projects ideas.

Neighborhood idea collection assemblies have the potential to foster the kinds of deep engagement that can benefit communities and strengthen democracy both by building civic skills and knowledge among residents and by bringing to the fore the best ideas for community improvement.<sup>21</sup>

# Residents could also submit project ideas online and at non-PB community events.

The vast majority of PB communities (83 percent) offered residents the opportunity to submit project ideas online via email, the district or city website, social media or mapping platforms. <sup>22</sup> Specifically, 82 percent of reporting city districts in New York City used the online map OpenPlans, which encourages residents to submit online and comment on others' proposals. <sup>23</sup> In Cambridge, Massachusetts, participants noted in feedback forms to implementers that they thought online maps for idea collection were useful, quick and easy. <sup>24</sup>

PB organizers may also give residents the opportunity to submit project ideas as part of their general outreach efforts. For example, organizers may set up information desks at non-PB community events and encourage passersby to fill in a project idea card. Communities that employ face-to-face canvassing methods during their outreach (see following) may also collect project ideas directly from residents as they meet them on the street or knock on their doors. In New York City, 64 percent of reporting districts said they used idea cards for residents to fill in on the spot during outreach.<sup>25</sup>

Informal, mobile or online strategies for collecting project ideas allow organizers a greater reach, give opportunities to residents who would otherwise not participate and presumably

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Community Development Project, "A People's Budget," 2015, 4.



<sup>21</sup> Tina Nabatchi and Matt Leighninger, Public Participation for 21st Century Democracy (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015); Gilman, Democracy Reinvented, 2016, 69–88.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> 41 processes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Community Development Project, "A People's Budget," 2015, 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Nada Zohdy, "Evaluating the Inaugural Participatory Budgeting Process in the City of Cambridge (2014–2015)" (Cambridge, MA: City of Cambridge Participatory Budgeting, 2015), http://pb.cambridgema.gov/pbcycle1.

add more project ideas. But the critical downside of these methods is that they are less likely to provide the kinds of deep engagement opportunities that can be facilitated in in-person meetings that include group discussions among diverse residents.<sup>26</sup>

To tell residents about PB, nearly all communities used online and digital tools. Far fewer conducted systematic person-to-person outreach. Person-to-person outreach was associated with greater participation of traditionally marginalized communities.

A key goal of most PB practitioners is to engage large and diverse numbers of residents at all stages in the process. Without substantial resident participation, PB cannot improve communities and become a real alternative to traditional government decision making. In interviews with Public Agenda, officials said that one of the most meaningful aspects of PB for them is to see diverse residents, especially those they haven't seen before, meet and engage with one another around community needs. We also consistently heard that PB—as they had experienced it—required nearly unsustainable outreach efforts by their staff and volunteers.<sup>27</sup>

Indeed, in 2014–15, PB organizers employed a wide array of methods to tell residents about PB during the idea collection phase. Most common were digital communications and tools. Evaluators and implementers from nearly all communities (95 percent and more) reported using email and social media (Facebook, Twitter and so forth) for outreach. Very common outreach methods were also flyers, traditional media (including TV, radio and newspapers) and a council member's or city council's website and newsletter—see Figure 4.

Far fewer communities employed time- and resource-intensive person-to-person outreach methods such as canvassing (49 percent), phone banking (44 percent) and door knocking (33 percent). Twenty-three percent reported sending mailings to residents' homes. Almost 1 in 5 (18 percent) reported using text messaging for outreach—see Figure 4.


Greater investments in person-to-person outreach, however, may pay off in the form of greater representation of people from traditionally marginalized communities—based on our analysis of data from 25 communities that conducted surveys with PB voters and included a question about how they had heard about the vote. In communities where door knocking was part of organizers' outreach strategy during the idea collection phase, an average of 43 percent of voter survey respondents indicated household incomes of less than \$25,000 a year; in communities that did not report employing door knocking as an outreach strategy during the idea collection phase, an average of 23 percent of voter survey respondents indicated household incomes of less than \$25,000 a year.

Similarly, analyses of voter surveys from 28 communities suggest that online and digital outreach attracted a disproportionate number of white and more affluent residents. Communities where more voter survey respondents said they had heard about the vote through online sources also had a larger representation of white residents (correlation r = .75), residents with college degrees (correlation r = .80) and residents with annual household incomes of \$100,000 or more (correlation r = .81) among voter survey respondents.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Lerner, Everyone Counts, 2014, 36–38; Su, "Whose Budget?," 2012, 5–6; Nabatchi and Leighninger, Public Participation for 21st Century Democracy, 2015; Gilman, Democracy Reinvented, 2016, 102–04.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Public Agenda conducted a longitudinal qualitative interview study with officials who implemented PB in 2014–15 and/or 2015–16 and officials in adjacent districts or cities who were not implementing PB. Findings from this research will be released in the summer of 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> 39 processes.





# BUDGET DELEGATE PHASE

# More than 1,000 resident volunteers turned project ideas into viable proposals.

A total of 1,039 resident volunteers worked as budget delegates across PB communities in 2014–15, as reported by implementers and evaluators. On average, there were 30 budget delegates in a community, ranging from as few as 8 in one community to 75 in another—see Figure 5. Overall, 139 budget delegate groups (or committees) were formed by these delegates, with an average of 4 committees per site, ranging from 1 to 10 committees across communities. Our estimates exclude seven PB sites (15 percent) that did not include a budget delegate phase—instead, city or district staff took on the tasks that are otherwise designated to budget delegates.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> 34 processes.



# Box 4: What is a budget delegate?

Budget delegates (also called community representatives) are resident volunteers who work in groups to develop project ideas into viable project proposals for the PB vote. Typical tasks for these groups include gathering more information about proposed project ideas, assessing their eligibility to be funded under the allocated budget source, requesting cost estimates from relevant city agencies and preparing project posters for the "voting expos"—events during which voters can learn more about the project on the ballot.

Communities vary in the extent to which budget delegates interact directly with city agencies to develop project proposals. They also vary in the extent to which budget committees are given guidance or suggestions on how to evaluate project ideas and the extent to which they are encouraged to research and develop project ideas other than the ones collected through the idea collection phase—for example, in New York City, budget delegate committees were provided with a matrix of equity criteria against which they could assess and rate the comparative need of any given project idea.<sup>30</sup>

Budget delegates are typically recruited during the idea collection phase. Residents can sign up at neighborhood idea collection assemblies and other idea collection events or contact PB organizers directly. Organizers are also reaching out to previous budget delegates, CBOs and their steering committees for help in recruiting volunteers for this phase of the PB process.

Typically, the budget delegate phase starts with an orientation during which volunteers learn more about their roles and responsibilities and form working groups. Working groups are led by facilitators who help the groups stay in touch and make progress on developing proposals.

The budget delegate phase often takes several weeks or months and can require a substantial time commitment from volunteers. Attrition tends to be significant. Our analyses are limited to the numbers of budget delegates that implementers and evaluators reported as being still active at the end of the budget delegate phase.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Pape and Lerner, "Budgeting for Equity" (manuscript in preparation, 2016).



## **VOTING PHASE**

# Residents voted across nearly 400 voting sites and more than 300 days.

Overall, PB communities reported creating 388 voting sites. On average, communities offered 8 different voting locations, ranging from 1 to 27—see Figure 6.

On average, PB voting spanned nearly a week (6.67 days), ranging from some processes reporting that they opened their voting station for just one day to some processes holding votes for well over a week and up to two weeks—see Figure 6. Adding up the number of voting days across all communities, voting totaled 307 days.

Perhaps surprisingly, we found only a moderate relationship between the number of voting sites communities offered and the number of people who came out to vote (correlation r = .54). The correlation between voting days and number of ballots cast was even smaller (correlation r = .37). In contrast, there was a strong correlation between the number of neighborhood idea collection assemblies communities organized and the total number of residents who participated in these idea collection events (see page 22).

## Few communities offered remote online voting opportunities.

Most PB communities have yet to experiment with remote online voting. Just 4 out of the 46 (9 percent) of PB communities offered remote online voting in the 2014–15 cycle. Some evaluators and implementers told us that they are held back by a lack of technical resources needed to build a website that allows for verification of voters' identities and addresses and protects from multiple voting. But we also heard concerns that online

# Box 5: Where and how do residents vote on projects in PB?

For PB, voting is organized by local government staff and volunteers. Voting is offered not only at the local district office or other government building, but at many locations around a community. Voting stations are set up in a variety of public sites, such as libraries, schools and community centers. So-called mobile voting stations may appear on markets or street festivals, near public transportation stops, at street corners, in the park, outside of houses of worship and so forth. Some communities also offer remote online voting.


Ballots are typically designed so that each project is represented with a name, a short description and a total dollar amount of its estimated costs. In many cases, ballot items are grouped by policy areas or the types of committees that developed them (for example, "Parks," "Education," "Youth" or others).

Typically, residents review a ballot of a dozen or more projects and can allocate multiple votes. The exact rules around how many votes each resident can allocate vary across PB sites. Sites also vary in how the ballot is structured and how votes can be distributed. For example, in Chicago the ballot includes a question for residents to note what percent of the allocated PB funds should go to street repairs but does not offer specific street repairs to choose from. Processes that include both capital and programmatic projects may set the rule that each resident needs to vote for projects in each of these categories.

Residents typically bring a proof of address to the voting site and add their name and address to a sign-in sheet. In many cases, volunteers check that the address is within the jurisdiction's boundaries. Aside from residents, many communities also allow people to vote who work or whose children attend a school in the jurisdiction.

voting would undermine the goal for PB to be a visible community event that brings together diverse residents. Some evaluators and implementers we spoke with warned that online voting may disproportionally reach populations of higher socioeconomic status and draw resources and attention away from mobilizing marginalized communities.

Some communities experimented with digital voting—that is, voting at in-person voting stations on digital devices. Digital voting is primarily a means to making counting and analyses of the vote (as well as of the voter surveys for evaluation purposes) more time efficient. We heard from implementers and evaluators that residents, especially youth, liked digital voting opportunities, sometimes so much so that they were less interested in filling in paper ballots, which in turn could lead to a slowdown at the voting stations.



140 partnerships between community-based organizations (CBOs) and government formed to increase participation in PB. CBO outreach was associated with higher representation of traditionally marginalized communities at the vote.

Evaluators and implementers reported a total of 140 collaborations between local government and CBOs to inform residents about PB and to encourage participation in the idea collection and voting stages.<sup>31</sup> On average, governments collaborated with about 4 CBOs to amplify their outreach to the community, but for several communities no such

<sup>31 37</sup> processes.

collaboration was reported, while one reported collaborations with 14 CBOs. Across PB communities, a total of 103 unique CBOs participated in these outreach collaborations.<sup>32</sup>

Outreach by CBOs was correlated with higher representation of lower-income residents, racial/ethnic minority residents and residents with less formal education—based on our analysis of data from 27 PB communities that conducted surveys with voters after they filled in ballots and asked how voters had heard about the vote. On average, 18 percent of voter survey respondents indicated that they had heard about the vote from a CBO, ranging from 7 percent in one community to as much as 41 percent in another. In communities where a larger proportion of voter survey respondents indicated they had heard about the PB vote from a CBO, more voter survey respondents reported household incomes of less than \$25,000 a year (correlation r = .42), identified as people of color (correlation r = .60) and reported not having attained a bachelor's degree (correlation r = .50). For example, in communities with the greatest representation of low-income residents among voter survey respondents, an average of 24 percent of respondents said they had heard about the vote from a CBO. In communities with the lowest representation of low-income residents among voter survey respondents, an average of only 14 percent of respondents had heard about the vote from a CBO.

Between less than 1% and 14% of the PB voting age population came out to vote.

## More than 70,000 residents cast ballots and voted on nearly 900 projects.

Overall, 73,381 ballots were collected in PB votes in 2014–15, ranging from 85 to 6,299 across communities—see Figure 6. This translates into an average voter turnout of 2.6 percent across communities, ranging from less than 1 percent to 14 percent of the census-estimated PB voting age population coming out to vote.<sup>33</sup>

In all, 892 projects were put forth on PB ballots in 2014–15.<sup>34</sup> Toronto Community Housing—which is a unique case of PB that technically combines 13 smaller PB processes (see page 55 for a more detailed description of this process)—had 297 ballot items alone. Not considering the Toronto Community Housing PB case, the average PB ballot had 14 items, with some ballots having as few as 6 projects and others as many as 27—see Figure 6.



## **IMPLEMENTATION PHASE**

The implementation phase starts after winning projects are decided on at the PB vote and technically extends until those winning projects are realized—constructed, painted, planted and the like. This process can take several years. Steering committees typically monitor the implementation of winning projects over time to keep local governments accountable to the PB decisions. For this report, we can present the total number of projects that won in PB in 2014–15 (see following) and a closer analysis of the types of projects that made it on the ballot and those that won (see Part 3). For this report, it was too early to collect implementation data on the projects that won in 2014–15 PB communities.

<sup>34</sup> These estimates may be slightly undercounting the total numbers of ballot items, as we had only partial information on ballot projects from two processes.




<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> For our purposes here, we counted as CBOs local nonprofits, community groups, religious institutions, business improvement districts, parent-teacher associations, political clubs, neighborhood associations and the like. We did not include schools, universities, government departments or agencies or private businesses.

<sup>33 39</sup> processes

# More than 350 projects won PB funding.

A total of 360 ballot projects won funding across PB processes in 2014–15. Toronto Community Housing alone had 136 winning projects. Not considering the Toronto Community Housing PB case, an average of five projects won PB funding allocations across communities, but in some communities just one project was allocated funds, while in others up to nine were allocated funds—see Figure 7.







# Who Participated? The Demographic Profile of Voter Survey Respondents

More than 70,000 residents voted in participatory budgeting across the U.S. and Canada between the summers of 2014 and 2015. These included youth and noncitizens who are ineligible to participate in traditional elections. They cast their vote at voting stations in community centers, at public markets and festivals or on street corners as organizers tried to "bring the vote to the people."

What do we know about the demographics of these PB voters? How representative were PB voters of their local communities? How successful were communities in engaging groups that are often marginalized from the political process?

# **Key findings:**

- AGE: Young people under 18 years old and seniors were overrepresented among survey respondents in many communities, while residents between 18 and 44 years of age were underrepresented. Overall, 11 percent of respondents were under 18 years of age.
- RACE/ETHNICITY: In nearly all communities, black residents were overrepresented
  or represented proportionally to the local census among voter survey respondents.
  Hispanics were underrepresented among survey respondents in most communities.
  Overall, blacks made up 21 percent of respondents and Hispanics made up 21 percent
  of respondents.
- **INCOME**: In most communities, residents from lower-income households were overrepresented or represented proportionally to the local census among voter survey respondents. Overall, 27 percent of respondents reported annual household incomes of less than \$25,000, and 19 percent reported annual household incomes between \$25,000 and \$49,000.
- EDUCATION: Residents with less formal education were underrepresented among voter survey respondents in most communities. Just 39 percent of respondents overall reported not having a college degree.
- **GENDER**: Women were overrepresented among voter survey respondents in nearly all communities. Overall, 62 percent of respondents were women.




Knowing demographic characteristics of PB voters helps to better understand whether votes come from a group of residents that is representative of its local community, including a representative number of residents belonging to groups that are traditionally underrepresented in the political process.

In this part of the report, we review findings from surveys of PB voters across five key demographic variables: age, income, education, race/ethnicity and gender.

We compare voter survey respondents' demographics to the demographic profile of the communities in which PB took place. For each demographic category, we will show the percent of PB sites where this group was over- vs. underrepresented among PB voter survey respondents. For the purpose of these analyses, overrepresentation means that the proportion of voter survey respondents in a given demographic category was more than five percentage points above the respective local census estimation. Underrepresentation means that the proportion of voter survey respondents in a given demographic category was more than five percentage points below the respective local census estimation.

Moreover, we present a demographic profile of survey respondents overall as well as information on how much communities varied in the extent to which each demographic group was represented among their voter survey respondents.



Analyses in this part of the report are limited to 29 PB processes that conducted demographic surveys of voters as part of their evaluation. Findings describe voter survey respondents but cannot be generalized to all PB voters.

The only currently feasible way to track demographic data in PB in U.S. and Canadian communities is to ask voters to complete short surveys after they have filled in their ballots. In 2014–15, such demographic voter surveys were collected in 29 out of the 46 PB communities. These included 21 council districts in New York City, 4 council wards in Chicago and 1 council district in Long Beach, California, as well as the cities of Vallejo, California; Cambridge, Massachusetts; and Saint-Basile-le-Grand, Quebec.

Across these 29 PB processes, 28,277 voter surveys were collected from 59,739 voters, which yielded an overall impressive response rate of 47 percent—the response rates ranged from 9 to 90 percent across communities.


Even though response rates on these voter surveys were overall high, findings cannot be generalized to all voters in a PB process. It is possible that voters who are willing to complete a demographic survey (that is, voter survey respondents) are demographically different from those who choose not to complete such surveys. Residents who are less likely to complete surveys may have on average less formal education or weren't given the opportunity to complete surveys in the language they are most comfortable with. Communities also varied in the extent to which they used mobile or pop-up voting sites—for instance, tables at open-air events, on the sidewalk or at subway entrances and bus stations. At these sites, it is typically more difficult than at more formal, indoor PB voting sites to encourage voters to complete surveys. All these factors may mean that the following analyses underestimate the representation of communities that are traditionally less likely to participate in political processes.

Tables in this section indicate that data are based on around 28,000 surveys. While this is an estimate of the total number of voter surveys collected, analyses are technically based on responses to around 15,000 that were analyzed. Owing to restricted resources, a random two-thirds of voter surveys collected in New York City were not entered for data analyses. Given the random selection process of these surveys, however, one can conclude that the more than 7,000 New York City surveys that contributed to the analyses are very close and reliable estimates of the total collected.

## **AGE**

In many communities, young people under 18 years old and seniors were overrepresented among survey respondents, while residents between 18 and 44 years of age were underrepresented. Overall, 11 percent of respondents were under 18 years of age, ranging from 0 to 40 percent across communities.

Residents under 18 years old were overrepresented among voter survey respondents in 29 percent of communities and represented proportionally to the local census in the remaining 71 percent. Similarly, residents 65 and over were overrepresented among survey respondents in 46 percent of PB communities and represented proportionally to the local census in half of the communities. In contrast, the representativeness of other age groups was more varied. Especially, 18- to 24-year-olds were underrepresented among survey respondents in nearly 7 in 10 communities (68 percent), and 25- to 44-year-olds were underrepresented in 46 percent of communities and overrepresented in 18 percent—see Figure 8.



#### Overrepresentation

means the percent of survey respondents in a given group was more than five percentage points above the census.

#### Underrepresentation

means the percent of survey respondents in a given group was more than five percentage points *below* the census.


**Note**: The percent of communities with group representation proportional to the census was the following: 71% for under 18, 32% for 18–24, 36% for 25–44, 39% for 45–64, and 50% for 65 and above.

Base: 28 processes, N=28,086 survey respondents.


Overall, 11 percent of PB voter survey respondents were under 18 and 6 percent were between 18 and 24 years of age. One-third was between 25 and 44 years of age. Similarly, 30 percent were between 45 and 64 years of age. And residents over 65 years of age made up 20 percent of PB respondents—see Figure 9.

There was also much variability in respondents' age distribution across communities. For example, the proportion of under-18-year-olds ranged from 0 to 40 percent. The proportion of 18- to 24-year-olds ranged from 1 to 18 percent, and the proportion of seniors among respondents ranged from 5 to 50 percent across communities—see Figure 10.

Figure 9. Percent of voter survey respondents, by age:



Base: 28 processes, N=28,086 survey respondents



represents the average percent of survey respondents in each group across 28 PB communities.

# Line

represents the range of percentages of survey respondents in each group across 28 PB communities. A longer line indicates more variation across PB communities in the percent of survey respondents in a respective group.


Base: 28 processes, N=28,086 survey respondents.

## **RACE/ETHNICITY**

In nearly all communities, black residents were overrepresented or represented proportionally to the local census among voter survey respondents. Hispanics were underrepresented among survey respondents in most PB sites. Overall, blacks made up 21 percent of respondents, ranging from to 1 to 95 percent. Hispanics made up 21 of percent respondents, ranging from 4 to 62 percent.

In just under half (46 percent) of PB communities, blacks were overrepresented among voter survey respondents compared with the local census. In another 43 percent, the proportion of blacks was representative of the local census. Similarly, whites were overrepresented among survey respondents in 54 percent of PB communities, and in 36 percent of processes the proportion of whites was representative of the local census—see Figure 11.

In contrast, Hispanic residents were underrepresented among survey respondents in 68 percent of PB communities and overrepresented in 4 percent. Asian residents were underrepresented in 32 percent of PB communities and overrepresented in none—see Figure 11.



#### Overrepresentation

means the percent of survey respondents in a given group was more than five percentage points above the census.

#### Underrepresentation


means the percent of survey respondents in a given group was more than five percentage points *below* the census.

Note: The percent of communities with group representation proportional to the census was the following: 68% for Asian, 43% for black or African-American, 27% for Hispanic or Latino/a and 36% for white.

Base: 28 processes, N=27,992 survey respondents.

Overall, blacks and Hispanics each made up 21 percent of voter survey respondents. About 10 percent of voter survey respondents identified as Asian, and 5 percent identified with another racial/ethnic group. Whites made up the largest proportion among all voter survey respondents (48 percent)—see Figure 12.35

Figure 12. Percent of voter survey respondents, by race/ethnicity:




Note: Percentages add up to more than 100 percent because voter survey respondents could select more than one race/ethnicity.

Base: 28 processes, N=27,992 survey respondents.

There was also much variability across communities in voter survey respondents' race/ethnicities: The proportion of black respondents ranged from 0.7 to 95 percent. The proportion of Hispanics ranged from 4 to 62 percent. The proportion of Asian respondents ranged from 0 to 28 percent, and the proportion of white respondents ranged between 3 and 91 percent—see Figure 13.

At the beginning of this part of the report, we discuss reasons associated with the voter survey methodology that could explain why Hispanic and Asian residents were underrepresented among voter survey respondents in a substantial number of communities—even if they might not have been underrepresented among these communities' voters overall. In addition, our numbers may reflect true underrepresentation of Hispanic and Asian residents among PB voters in the communities we were able to include in our analysis. For example, underrepresentation may be the result of communities not having sufficiently invested in outreach in languages other than English. There are significant potential language barriers at each stage of the PB process and especially in the voting phase, when outreach materials, ballot explanations and ballots aren't available in the languages residents feel most comfortable with.

<sup>35</sup> PB participant surveys allow participants to select more than one race/ethnicity, while the U.S. Census and American Community Survey report race and ethnicity data in mutually exclusive categories. Comparisons between these two data sources are therefore not a perfect match. Across PB communities, no more than 9 percent of PB voter survey respondents checked off more than one race/ethnicity category. Also see Public Agenda, "Participatory Budgeting (PB) Evaluation Tip Sheet 1: Comparing Demographic Data Collected Through Surveys in U.S. PB sites to Local U.S. Census Demographics," 2016, http://www.publicagenda.org/files/PB\_Census\_Data\_Comparison\_Tip\_Sheet\_1.pdf.



# Dot

represents the average percent of survey respondents in each group across 28 PB communities.

#### Line


represents the range of percentages of survey respondents in each group across 28 PB communities. A longer line indicates more variation across PB communities in the percent of survey respondents in a respective group.

**Base**: 28 processes, N=27,992 survey respondents.

## **INCOME**

In most communities, residents from lower-income households were overrepresented or represented proportionally to the local census among voter survey respondents. Overall, 27 percent of respondents reported annual household incomes of less than \$25,000, ranging from 5 to 71 percent. And 19 percent of respondents reported annual household incomes between \$25,000 and \$49,000, ranging from 8 to 35 percent.

The representation of middle-income groups among voter survey respondents was proportional to local census data in the vast majority of PB communities. However, in 29 percent of communities, residents in the lowest income bracket (reporting annual household incomes of less than \$25,000) were underrepresented, while in another 25 percent of communities this income group was overrepresented among survey respondents and vis-à-vis the local census. Similarly, residents in the highest income bracket (reporting annual household incomes of \$100,000 or more) were overrepresented in 39 percent of PB communities and underrepresented in 32 percent of communities—see Figure 14.



Overall, about 27 percent of survey respondents reported annual household incomes of less than \$25,000; 19 percent reported annual household incomes between \$25,000 and \$49,000. In contrast, 28 percent reported annual household incomes of \$100,000 or more—see Figure 15.

#### Overrepresentation

means the percent of survey respondents in a given group was more than five percentage points above the census.


#### Underrepresentation

means the percent of survey respondents in a given group was more than five percentage points below the census.

**Note:** The percent of communities with group representation proportional to the census was the following: 46% for under \$25,000, 75% for \$25,000–\$49,999, 86% for \$50,000–\$74,999, 86% for \$75,000–\$79,999 and 29% for \$100,000 and above.

**Base**: 28 processes, N=27,992 survey respondents.


Figure 15. Percent of voter survey respondents, by annual household income:



Base: 28 processes, N=27,992 survey respondents.

There was also much variability across communities' ability to engage lower-income residents in the voting process. The percent of voter survey respondents from households making less than \$25,000 a year ranged from 5 to 71 percent across communities. The percent of respondents with annual household incomes between \$25,000 and \$49,000 ranged from 8 to 35 percent. In contrast, the percent of respondents with annual household incomes of \$100,000 or more ranges from 0 to 61 percent—see Figure 16.

Figure 16. Percent of voter survey respondents by annual household income, averages and ranges:



represents the average percent of survey respondents in each group across 28 PB communities.

#### Line

represents the range of percentages of survey respondents in each group across 28 PB communities. A longer line indicates more variation across PB communities in the percent of survey respondents in a respective group.


Base: 28 processes, N=27,992 survey respondents.

## **EDUCATION**

In most communities, residents with less formal education were underrepresented among voter survey respondents. Just 40 percent of respondents overall reported not having a bachelor's degree, ranging from 8 to 94 percent across communities.

We calculated education data for voter survey respondents who also reported being 25 years old or older. As such, these data can also be compared with the local census data.

In the vast majority of PB communities, residents with less than a high school degree and those with high school degrees as their highest level of formal education were underrepresented among respondents (in 81 percent and 67 percent of communities, respectively). In contrast, in 89 percent of PB communities, residents with a postgraduate degree were overrepresented among voter survey respondents. Residents whose highest level of education is a bachelor's degree were overrepresented in 41 percent of PB communities—see Figure 17.



#### Overrepresentation

means the percent of survey respondents in a given group was more than five percentage points above the census.

## Underrepresentation

means the percent of survey respondents in a given group was more than five percentage points *below* the census.

Note: The percent of communities with group representation proportional to the census was the following: 19% for less than high school, 19% for high school or GED, 59% for some college or associate's degree, 48% for bachelor's degree and 11% for graduate degree or above.

Base: 27 processes, N=25,818 survey respondents.


Overall, 1 in 5 voter survey respondents (21 percent) had a high school degree or less. In contrast, 25 percent reported a bachelor's degree as their highest level of education, and 36 percent reported having a postgraduate degree—see Figure 18.

19% 7% 14% 25% 36% Less than High School Some College Bachelor's Graduate High School or GED or Associate's Degree Degree Degree or Above Base: 27 processes, N=25,818 survey respondents.

Figure 18. Percent of voter survey respondents, by level of education:

Across PB communities, the proportion of respondents with less than a high school degree ranged from 0 to 29 percent. The proportion of respondents with a high school degree as their highest level of formal education ranged from 1 to 42 percent. In contrast, voter survey respondents having a graduate school degree ranged from 3 to 65 percent across these PB communities—see Figure 19.

It may seem surprising that while substantial numbers of voter survey respondents reported comparatively low household incomes (for example, below \$25,000 or between \$25,000 and \$50,000), we also found that a large majority reported high levels of formal education. This is partly because the income distribution includes responses from all survey respondents, while the education distribution is limited to respondents 25 years or older. Further analysis suggests that in these surveys, younger respondents and seniors were most likely to report lower household incomes. There are again a number of reasons younger respondents may have reported lower household incomes than middle-aged respondents—for instance, younger people, when living alone, may have lower household incomes than middle-aged adults. PB communities may have focused outreach on lower-income younger adults and youth and as a result been more successful at engaging this population than lower-income middle-aged adults. Younger lower-income youths may be more likely than lower-income middle-aged adults to complete voter surveys. Younger people, when living with family members, may underestimate the total household income.





## Dot

represents the average percent of survey respondents in each group across 27 PB communities.

## Line

represents the range of percentages of survey respondents in each group across 27 PB communities. A longer line indicates more variation across PB communities in the percent of survey respondents in a respective group.

Base: 27 processes, N=25,818 survey respondents.


## **GENDER**

In nearly all communities, women were overrepresented among voter survey respondents. Overall, two-thirds of voter survey respondents were women, ranging from 49 to 75 percent across communities.

In 90 percent of PB communities, women were overrepresented among voter survey respondents—see Figure 20.

Overall, voter survey respondents were substantially more likely to be women than men (62 percent vs. 38 percent). Under 1 percent of respondents identified as transgender or with another gender identity, respectively—see Figure 21.

On average, the proportion of women among voter survey respondents was 62 percent, ranging from 49 to 75 percent across communities—see Figure 22.



#### Overrepresentation

means the percent of survey respondents in a given group was more than five percentage points above the census.

### Underrepresentation


means the percent of survey respondents in a given group was more than five percentage points *below* the census.

**Note:** The percent of communities with group representation proportional to the census was the following: 10% for female and 10% for male.

Base: 29 processes, N=28,277 survey respondents.




Figure 21. Percent of voter survey respondents, by gender:



Note: Under 1 percent of respondents identified as transgender or with another gender identity.

Base: 29 processes, N=28,277 survey respondents.



# Dot

#### Dot

represents the average percent of survey respondents in each group across 29 PB communities.

#### Line

represents the range of percentages of survey respondents in each group across 29 PB communities. A longer line indicates more variation across PB communities in the percent of survey respondents in a respective group.

**Base**: 29 processes, N=28,277 survey respondents.



# What Got Funded? Ballots and Winning Projects

A total of 360 projects won the popular vote in PB between the summers of 2014 and 2015. In nearly 90 percent of communities, the money allocated to PB was restricted to capital projects—that is, longer-term infrastructure projects. In a few communities, PB-allocated money could also be spent on programmatic projects—those that can support service delivery and personnel.

What kinds of projects made it on the ballots? How varied were the projects residents could vote on? What types of projects received the largest amount of PB allocations? And what kinds of projects were most and least likely to win residents' votes?

# **Key findings:**

- Parks and recreation projects were the most common ballot items overall, followed by school projects. But ballots varied substantially—some included no parks and recreation or no school projects.
- Overall, schools received the largest share (33 percent) of PB-allocated funds.
- Public safety projects were rare on ballots but had a high chance of winning.
- Public housing projects were rare on ballots and had a low chance of winning.

The projects that win PB budget allocations are the most concrete immediate result of PB. Because PB includes a popular vote, it has the potential not only to highlight communities' greatest needs, concerns and values, but to substantially change how resources actually get allocated. Examining what types of projects get on the ballot and what ends up winning in current PB practice in the U.S. and Canada is an important step toward understanding PB's impact on government decision making and its potential to effect socially equitable resource allocation.

In this part of the report, we examine the projects that made it onto PB ballots in the 2014–15 cycle and those that were allocated PB funding (winning projects) in terms of the policy areas or community sectors they benefited—for example, schools, parks, public housing and so forth. We analyze what policy areas ended up receiving the largest proportion of PB allocations and whether some policy areas were more likely to win residents' votes than others.



In the course of reviewing the following data, it is important to keep in mind a couple of constraints to PB processes as currently implemented in the U.S. and Canada. As mentioned in the introduction, several observers have argued that current PB budgets are too small and too restricted and that for the process to have a chance at significantly improving community well-being, larger budgets and budgets other than capital funds may need to be allocated.<sup>36</sup>

Moreover, as useful background to the following section, readers may want to review Box 5 in Part 1, which summarizes key characteristics about voting in PB. For example, residents are typically given several votes each in a PB process, but communities vary in exactly how many votes residents are given. Communities may also apply slightly different rules in how votes can be distributed.

Finally, the following analyses exclude projects from the Toronto Community Housing PB site. See Box 7 for a fuller explanation of why we excluded the Toronto Community Housing PB process from the project analyses.

# Box 6: Examples of projects under each of eight policy areas

Community & Social Services: Upgrades to or construction of community centers, senior centers; services or programs for senior citizens, youth, the disabled, homeless and the like; community services such as composting sites; community gardens.

**Culture, Arts & Libraries:** Murals or other public art; upgrades to or construction of performing arts centers, museums, theaters or libraries; cultural events; community dances; equipment that benefits arts programs, art groups or libraries.

Parks & Recreation: Construction of parks, playgrounds, dog parks or sports facilities; upgrades to these areas, including new equipment, restroom upgrades, drinking fountain improvements and so on.

**Public Housing:** Any project that benefits a public housing complex or neighborhood, such as security cameras, benches, playgrounds, sports courts, general grounds improvements and so forth.

**Public Safety:** Security cameras; increased lighting for security purposes, on streets or in parks; equipment for the fire department or police department; increased police patrol.

**Schools:** Any project that benefits a school, such as improvements to restroom, air-conditioning or other facilities within the school; computers or technology for schools; musical instruments or equipment for the school; sports equipment or sports facilities.

**Streets & Sidewalks:** Street repairs, such as street resurfacing or filling potholes; sidewalk repairs or expansions; streetlights, if not specified for public safety.


**Transportation & Traffic:** Public transportation improvements, such as bus stop shelters or timers, subway stations or more; traffic light improvements, especially at intersections; crosswalks; bike lanes.

<sup>36</sup> Su, "Whose Budget?," 2012; Pape and Lerner, "Budgeting for Equity" (manuscript in preparation, 2016); Hagelskamp, "On Participatory Budgeting and Democracy," 2016.

# The most common ballot items were parks and recreation projects, as well as school projects.

Overall, 892 different projects were put on PB ballots in 2014–15. Not counting 297 ballot items from Toronto Community Housing, the total number of PB projects on the remaining 45 ballots was about 595.<sup>37</sup> Figure 23 shows the percent of these ballot items across eight policy areas that Public Agenda's research team defined for this research.<sup>38</sup>

Overall, the most common ballot projects fell into the categories of parks and recreation (23 percent) as well as schools (22 percent), followed by projects in the policy areas of community and social services (15 percent), culture, arts and libraries (10 percent), streets and sidewalks (9 percent) and transportation and traffic (9 percent). Public housing and public safety projects were the least common ballot items (7 and 4 percent, respectively)—see Figure 23. See Box 6 for descriptions of each policy area and examples of actual projects that were on the 2014–15 ballots.




<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> These estimates may be slightly undercounting the total numbers of ballot items, as we had only partial information on ballot projects from two processes.

<sup>38</sup> Ballots often group projects by the focus areas of the budget committees that developed the projects. As these ballot categories aren't consistent across PB communities, Public Agenda's research team coded for this research each 2014–15 PB ballot item in a predefined rubric of eight policy areas.

# Ballots also varied substantially in the number and breadth of project types residents could vote on.

The average ballot included projects across five policy areas, ranging from as little as one to as many as eight policy areas in a single ballot.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, on the average ballot residents had 14 projects to vote on, ranging from a few communities that had only 6 projects on their ballot to some that had as many as 27 projects on their ballot.<sup>40</sup>

Even though parks and recreation projects were the most common ballot items overall, some ballots had no parks and recreation projects and one ballot consisted exclusively of parks and recreation projects. Similarly, school projects were among the most common ballot items, but some ballots included no school projects, while in one case school projects made up more than 70 percent of ballot items. Further, while the majority of ballots did not include public housing or public safety projects, public housing made up as much as a third of projects on one ballot, and public safety made up as much as 50 percent of projects on a ballot<sup>41</sup>—see Figure 24.



Dot

represents the average percent of ballot projects in a given policy area across communities.

#### Line

represents the range of percentages of ballot projects in a given policy area across communities. A longer line indicates more variation across PB communities in the percent of ballot projects in that policy area.

Base: 43 processes, N=588 projects.

<sup>39 43</sup> processes.


<sup>40 43</sup> processes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> 43 processes.

## One-third of PB-allocated dollars went to schools.

The average costs of a winning project in 2014–15 PB communities was just under \$200,000 (\$195,506), ranging from \$1,071 to \$1 million.<sup>42</sup> Figure 25 shows both the absolute number of winning projects in each policy area and the percent of PB funds allocated to each policy area. The largest number of winning projects benefited schools, and overall, one-third of all allocated PB funds went to school projects. Parks & Recreation—the most common ballot item category—had the second-highest number of winning projects (38) and received 15 percent of total allocated PB dollars.

Public housing and public safety projects—the categories least common on the ballot overall—had the fewest number of winning projects overall (12 and 16, respectively) and the smallest allocation of PB dollars (6 and 5 percent, respectively)—see Figure 25.




<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Estimated prices of Canadian PB projects have been converted to U.S. dollars to make the analysis comparable.

# Public safety projects were rare on ballots but had a high chance of winning. This was not the case for public housing projects.

Overall, 37 percent of ballot projects won PB funding. However, that varied across project categories. While Parks & Recreation was the most common ballot item, only 28 percent of parks and recreation projects received enough votes to win funding. School projects, which received the overall largest proportion of PB money allocations, won at a just above average rate (39 percent)—see Figure 26.

Public safety projects, however, won at a 7 in 10 rate. There were few of them on the ballots, but a comparatively large proportion of these projects won. A different situation occurred with public housing projects. Overall, public housing projects were rare on the ballots and less than 1 in 5 (19 percent) of them won PB funding.



# When PB brings in additional funds, where do they go?

We know anecdotally that PB has inspired additional funding allocations beyond the original budget officials allocated to the PB process. There is no systematic research to date on whether PB generally brings additional funds to communities or not—and if so, when that happens and for what kinds of projects. However, it is important to consider the possibility of such effects when evaluating PB's potential to impact resource allocations and community well-being in the long term. Here are a few examples of additional project funding that evaluators or implementers reported as having been inspired by a PB process (not restricted to the 2014–15 PB cycle):

In several instances, we heard that officials have been inspired to fund other projects on the ballot that they felt had merit even if these projects hadn't received the most votes. In some cases, third parties—such as neighborhood associations, nonprofits or private donors—have been reported to pledge money to fund ballot items that didn't get enough regular PB votes to be funded. In one case, when a council member noticed over a couple of PB cycles that public art projects were not likely to win enough votes over the other types of projects on the ballot to get funded, she increased the amount of money she devoted to public arts in the rest of her budget, outside of PB allocation.

Moreover, where PB is only in some communities and not others within a larger city, such as New York City or Chicago, there have been some instances where certain types of projects consistently won cycle after cycle, leading city agencies to take action on a citywide level. For example, in Chicago, the Chicago Plays! Playground Program—which has funded \$625,000 in parks improvements since 2013—was inspired by the park and playground improvements that were getting funded through the PB process in the 49th Ward. 43

We hope that future research and evaluation efforts can track and systematically examine instances where PB seems to have attracted extra funding to a community, highlighted a need that was then addressed on a wider level or affected government spending decisions in ways outside the immediate PB process.

# Box 7: Why Toronto Community Housing PB is excluded in these project analyses

Toronto Community Housing is a nonprofit organization owned by the city of Toronto and the second-largest social housing provider in North America. Its buildings and residential spaces are subdivided and managed as 13 operating units or building groups. In the Toronto Community Housing PB process, each building group technically runs a distinct PB process with its own budget, group of residents and ballot. Each PB process focuses on improvement in and around its relevant building group. All 13 processes are initiated and coordinated through the nonprofit. Throughout this report, we treat Toronto Community Housing PB as one PB site.

We decided to exclude Toronto Community
Housing entirely from most of our analyses of
ballot items and winning projects for the following
reasons. As the largest PB process in our analysis,
Toronto Community Housing alone accounted for
297 ballot items and 136 winning projects. All these
projects were coded as "public housing" projects in
the policy area rubric we developed for this research.
Given how rarely public housing projects appeared
on PB ballots in more traditional district- and
city-level PB processes, the inclusion of Toronto
Community Housing ballot items and winning
projects would have significantly biased the
representation of public housing projects across
all PB processes included in this report.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Thea Crum et al., "Building a People's Budget: Draft Research and Evaluation Report on the 2013-2014 Participatory Budgeting Process in Chicago," (Chicago: University of Illinois at Chicago Great Cities Institute, 2015), https://greatcities.uic.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Building-a-Peoples-Budget-2013-2014-PB-Research-Report.pdf.

# QUESTIONS FOR NATIONAL AND LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS

This report offers an unprecedented summary of what we know about the current implementation and the most immediate outcomes of participatory budgeting in the U.S. and Canada. It brings together data collection efforts of local evaluation teams and PB implementers across 46 communities that undertook PB in 2014–15. Given that we are already counting 60 active PB communities in the 2015–16 cycle, the numbers presented here are only likely to increase over the next few years.

Beyond documenting the sheer size and variability of PB across communities, we hope this publication will stimulate national and local discussion about PB and its potential to positively impact individuals, communities and government across the U.S. and Canada. Moreover, the data presented here point to important directions for future research and evaluation.

We therefore conclude with some critical questions for national and local PB stakeholders—including advocates, community groups, critics, funders, policymakers, practitioners, researchers, residents and others—who are debating PB's current state and potential impacts, working on refining its implementation or conducting further research and evaluations. Each question is anchored in a finding of this report.

# Questions about PB's potential to spread and scale:

- With an average of \$1 million allocated in each PB community, what can be achieved? Do current PB allocations match communities' goals and expectations for PB? What goals can be achieved by current budget allocations, and what goals can be achieved only with greater allocations and different budgets?
- How do communities support and finance the implementation of PB, and how sustainable are these strategies? What do we know about the resources and strategies that are being invested to make PB happen? What other work do council members and their staff de-emphasize while implementing PB?
- What community conditions facilitate or hinder successful implementation of PB? To what extent does PB require a supportive civic infrastructure in order to fulfill local goals and needs? What does such a civic infrastructure include?

# Questions about implementation:

- What are the various goals local communities have for PB, and how are they communicated?
   Some communities may emphasize more than others goals to include traditionally marginalized residents and to distribute resources to areas of greatest need.
   How do explicit goals and communications affect participation, projects and resource allocations?
- What is the quality of deliberation—when and how do residents consider the trade-offs of various community needs and projects? When and how can implementers facilitate deliberations at idea collection events, in budget delegate committees, online and as residents review ballot items and cast their vote? When and how do deliberations help participants learn and refine their views on community priorities?
- How do online and digital tools for outreach and engagement affect who participates and what gets funded? What are the pros and cons of the increasing use of digital tools in PB?

 As communities vary in voting rules and ballot design, how does that impact voting patterns?
 Can voting rules and ballot design affect what types of projects win? If so, how are these aspects of PB implementation best employed to achieve local communities' goals and expectations for PB?

# Questions about participation:

- Why are some communities better than others at engaging traditionally marginalized communities?
   Aside from outreach methods, what impacts participation of lower-income residents, people of color and people with less formal education?
- What are the characteristics and motivations of residents who submit project ideas and volunteer as budget delegates? Do the demographics and interests of these participants impact what projects make it on the ballot?
- How do PB participation rates and participant demographics compare with those in other types of local civic and political engagement? Does PB bring out similar or different types of residents compared with traditional local elections or other opportunities for civic and political participation?

# Questions about ballot items and winning projects:

- What do we know about the processes by which projects make it on the ballot? What are biases in these processes, and how do they support or undermine a community's larger goals and expectations of PB?
- How do money allocations in PB differ from those that are happening without PB? Are schools or parks receiving more funds through PB than they would without PB? What types of projects, policy areas or communities are less likely to be allocated resources through PB?

# Questions about long-term impacts:

- What exactly may be PB's key long-term impacts on the health of U.S. and Canadian communities?
   How can these impacts be defined and measured?
   How long do we expect it will take for PB to have these impacts?
- Are there long-term impacts on the civic skills, attitudes and behaviors of participants? Does
   PB have different effects on different resident groups' attitudes and behaviors over the long term? What are these impacts, and how do they benefit the community at large?
- Does PB lead to more equitable distribution of resources? When and how does PB address areas of greatest need in the community?
- How does PB affect government decision making outside of the PB process? Do public officials and agencies take lessons learned from PB to change the ways they work on other issues and with different budgets?



# METHODOLOGY

## **Summary**

The findings in "Public Spending, by the People" are based on data collected from all 46 jurisdictions in the United States and Canada that undertook a participatory budgeting (PB) process with votes held between July 2014 and June 2015.

PB evaluation and implementation teams in these 46 jurisdictions collected most of the data presented in this report and shared it with Public Agenda. Public Agenda collected additional relevant information about each site through public sources. Public Agenda combined data from various sources into one data set, conducted the analyses and wrote the report. PB local evaluators and implementers provided feedback on the analyses and the final report.

This work was funded through grants to Public Agenda from the Democracy Fund and the Rita Allen Foundation and through a research partnership between Public Agenda and the Kettering Foundation.

# Key metrics for evaluating PB

The data collection for this research was guided by a framework of 15 key metrics for evaluating PB that Public Agenda published in 2015. See: http://www.publicagenda.org/pages/research-and-evaluation-of-participatory-budgeting-in-the-us-and-canada.

These 15 metrics specify data points about PB implementation, participation and winning projects that are important for a better understanding of the current state of PB in the U.S. and Canada, for the tracking of its immediate outputs and for the clarification of its potential long-term impacts. Each data point discussed in this report is connected to one of these 15 metrics and the evaluation questions and goals that correspond to them.

Public Agenda developed the 15 key metrics and an accompanying evaluation toolkit in collaboration with the North American PB Research Board and the nonprofit organization the Participatory Budgeting Project. We drew on existing work and experiences of local PB evaluators in the U.S. and Canada and around the world, as well as the academic literature on PB as a democratic innovation.

# **Included PB jurisdictions**

Forty-one of the 46 jurisdictions included in this report are in the U.S. Those are New York City (NY) Council Districts 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 19, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 44, 45 and 47; the 22nd, 45th and 49th Wards and the West Humboldt Park Tax Increment Finance district in Chicago (IL); Long Beach (CA) Districts 1, 3 and 9; San Francisco (CA) Districts 7 and 10; St. Louis Ward 15; San Juan (PR) neighborhoods Caimito, Residencial Luis Llorens Torres, Martín Peña Canal and Venus Gardens; and the cities of Boston (MA), Cambridge (MA) and Vallejo (CA).

Five jurisdictions included in this report are in Canada. Those are Halifax (Nova Scotia) Council Districts 7 and 8; the cities of Hinton (Alberta) and Saint-Basile-le-Grand (Quebec); and Toronto Community Housing, a nonprofit social housing provider owned by the city of Toronto (Ontario).

All 46 PB communities are treated as separate sites in the current analyses. That is because each had its own PB budget allocation, its own ballot and its own community of residents. However, not all sites were equally independent of one another. Most notable, the 24 New York City districts shared one citywide steering committee and followed one rule book. They also shared centralized resources offered through the city council, including outreach and communications support, ballot translations and the like. In addition, New York City districts had local district committees that oversaw and assisted with the implementation of each process. Similarly, in Chicago three PB wards shared a citywide steering committee and a rule book, but there was not the same level of centralized resources as was offered in New York City. Each ward also had its own ward-level committee, which assisted in the implementation. The four processes in San Juan, Puerto Rico, were all initiated by the same public official, but in distinct neighborhoods. These processes did not have a steering committee but were led primarily by an independent community-based organization that contracted with the government. In Halifax, Canada, two district processes were largely run and coordinated together through the regional municipal office, with no outside steering committee.

Finally, Toronto Community Housing PB is considered one PB site in the current analyses, even though it was technically a conglomerate of 13 individual PB processes—1 for each building group, and each with its own budget allocation, ballot and community of residents. All 13 processes were coordinated by the same nonprofit organization, Toronto Community Housing, a social housing provider wholly owned by the City of Toronto. Given Toronto Community Housing PB is a very unique case of PB for the U.S. and Canada, counting it as 13 distinct processes would have biased our overall analysis.

## Data categories and sources

**Key descriptors.** Data in this category include, from each PB process, information such as the dollar amount allocated to the projects, voting eligibility criteria, the length of the process in months and other such descriptors. Public Agenda collected this information through public, Web-based sources or by directly contacting the evaluators or implementers of specific processes.

Implementation data. Data in this category include, from each PB process, information such as the number of neighborhood idea collection events held and their turnout, the number of budget delegates and budget delegate committees, the number of community-based organizations involved in outreach, outreach methods employed by local implementers, the number of voting sites and voting days and so on. Public Agenda collected this information a) from evaluation data that local evaluation teams shared directly with Public Agenda; b) through a questionnaire Public Agenda developed specifically for this purpose, to be completed by local evaluators or implementers (a copy of this questionnaire is part of "15 Key Metrics for Evaluating Participatory Budgeting" and can be downloaded here: http://www.publicagenda.org/ pages/research-and-evaluation-of-participatorybudgeting-in-the-us-and-canada); c) from publicly accessible evaluation reports published by local evaluation teams; and d) through other public, Web-based sources.

Voter and census demographics. Data in this category include demographic information of PB voters collected from surveys with voters at voting stations, especially voters' ages, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, annual household income and gender. In 29 of the 46 PB sites included in this research, local evaluation teams collected such demographic information from PB voters through voter surveys at the voting site and shared these data with Public Agenda. These surveys were typically designed to ask for demographic information in ways that are equivalent to how the U.S. Census and the American Community Survey asked about these demographics (a sample of a PB voter survey is available for download

here: http://www.publicagenda.org/pages/research-and-evaluation-of-participatory-budgeting-in-the-us-and-canada). In addition, Public Agenda compiled equivalent demographic estimates for the total population (in each PB jurisdiction) that was old enough to vote in the PB processes by a) drawing on census information local evaluators had already collected, and b) by going directly to the census website. A tip sheet with details for how both the PB voter survey demographics and the census data need to be collected and coded to allow for valid comparisons can be found here: http://www.publicagenda.org/media/participatory-budgeting-evaluation-tip-sheets.

Ballot items and winning projects. Data in this category include, for each PB process, titles, descriptions and estimated prices of all projects on the PB ballot and a designation for whether or not a project received enough votes to be allocated PB funding (that is, a winning project). Public Agenda collected this information from public, Web-based sources and contacted local evaluators directly in rare cases where not all this information was publicly available.

# Data coding

We aimed to code the information we collected for each variable to match specifications and recommendations in "15 Key Metrics for Evaluating Participatory Budgeting." When variables were created from a variety of different data sources, decisions needed to be made for how to sensibly combine diverse information. Where relevant in the report, we provide details on how information on specific variables was collected and combined from different sources across PB.

# Data analysis

We created two distinct data sets from the data collected across the 46 PB jurisdictions. One data set describes key characteristics of each process (that is, it consists of 46 unique cases), including the aggregated demographic information from a site's voter surveys. The second data set describes key characteristics of all projects on a PB ballot in those jurisdictions (that is, it consists of 892 unique cases).



The report summarizes analyses of aggregated data from the respective data sets. Aside from a few noted exceptions, we do not highlight individual data points for a specific PB site. The analyses focus on descriptive statistics and emphasize total sums, averages and ranges for each variable. In some cases, we present additional analyses and state so in the report. Whenever a finding is based on less than the total of 46 PB sites (typically because of missing data), we indicate that by including a footnote with the precise number of PB sites the finding is based on. We also note the few instances where we excluded a site or more from an analysis because it was too much of an outlier and would have biased the analysis.

In relevant sections throughout the report, we provide more detail on analyses of specific data points—for instance, how we compared voter survey demographics with local census data and the cutoffs we used to analyze whether a demographic subgroup was over- or underrepresented among voter survey respondents.

# **Key limitations**

In relevant sections throughout the report, we discuss limitations of our data and/or our analyses that are important for readers to consider when interpreting the findings. The following are two limitations to this research that apply to multiple analyses in this report.

- 1. Several data points were not collected in a standardized way but through a variety of sources. To learn how different sites implemented PB (e.g. the number of neighborhood idea collection assemblies that were held, number of participants who attended assemblies, number of active budget delegates, number and types of voting sites, types of outreach methods used), Public Agenda relied on a combination of internet research, published research reports, surveys with implementers as well as the data and knowledge that local evaluation teams shared with us directly. Some evaluation teams in turn relied on implementers to report information to them and then shared this information with Public Agenda. Other evaluators observed events directly or used other methods of information gathering. Possible biases in our data may therefore stem from known and unknown differences in how PB sites and/or different individuals define and count key characteristics of the PB process, biases in reporters' memory and recollection of events, as well as variations in reporters' motivations or incentives to over- or underreport information.
- 2. Voter demographics have so far been collected solely through voter self-report surveys. PB voter surveys have been a unique and invaluable (as well as tremendously resource-intensive) data source for PB evaluations. But they have significant potential biases, as we also discuss in the report. They are likely to undercount groups that feel less comfortable completing surveys and especially demographic surveys. They are especially difficult to collect at outdoor or mobile voting stations and may thus undercount populations especially targeted by these voting sites. They undercount voters who are not comfortable completing these surveys in English and for whom no suitable translation of the survey is available.

If you have questions or want more information on any aspect of the methodology for this research, please email: research@publicagenda.org.

# 2014–15 PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING PROCESSES IN THE U.S. AND CANADA

Below is the full list of PB processes across the U.S. and Canada that held their vote between July 2014 and June 2015 and that were undertaken by a city council, council member or city agency.

For each PB process we included the name of the jurisdiction, the name(s) and/or title(s) of the public official(s) who made the decision to undertake the process, the month and year of the vote and the total dollar amount allocated to winning projects.

### **UNITED STATES**

## PB Boston (Boston, MA)

City of Boston, Mayor's Youth Council, May 2015 vote, US\$955,600

## PB Cambridge (Cambridge, MA)

City of Cambridge, Mayor David Maher and Cambridge City Council, March 2015 vote, US\$528,000

## PB Chicago (Chicago, IL)

22nd Ward, Alderman Ricardo Muñoz, April 2015 vote, US\$924,950

45th Ward, Alderman John Arena, April 2015 vote, US\$1,030,000

49th Ward, Alderman Joe Moore, April 2015 vote, US\$992,000

Chicago Central Park TIF District, November 2014 vote, US\$2,000,000

## PB Long Beach (Long Beach, CA)

District 1, Council Member Lena Gonzalez, June 2015 vote, US\$61,000

District 3, Council Member Suzie Price, June 2015 vote, US\$110,000

District 9, Council Member Rex Richardson, March 2015 vote, US\$295,000

## PB New York City (New York, NY)

District 3, Council Member Corey Johnson, March-April 2015 vote, US\$1,680,000

District 5, Council Member Ben Kallos, March-April 2015 vote, US\$1,000,000

District 6, Council Member Helen Rosenthal, March-April 2015 vote, US\$990,000

District 7, Council Member Mark Levine, March-April 2015 vote, US\$1,300,000

District 8, Council Speaker Melissa Mark-Viverito, March-April 2015 vote, US\$2,150,000

District 10, Council Member Ydanis Rodriguez, March-April 2015 vote, US\$1,000,000

District 11, Council Member Andrew Cohen, March-April 2015 vote, US\$2,015,000

District 15, Council Member Ritchie Torres, March-April 2015 vote, US\$1,070,000 District 19, Council Member Paul Vallone, March-April 2015 vote, US\$995,000

District 21, Council Member Julissa Ferreras, March-April 2015 vote, US\$921,000

District 22, Council Member Costa Constantinides, March-April 2015 vote, US\$1,245,000

District 23, former Council Member Mark Weprin, March-April 2015 vote, US\$1,205,000

District 26, Council Member Jimmy Van Bramer, March-April 2015 vote, US\$1,530,000

District 27, Council Member
I. Daneek Miller, March-April 2015
vote, US\$1,124,000
District 29, Council Member
Karen Koslowitz, March-April 2015
vote, US\$1,116,000

District 31, Council Member Donovan Richards, March-April 2015 vote, US\$1,225,000

District 32, Council Member Eric Ulrich, March-April 2015 vote, US\$2,510,000 District 33, Council Member Stephen Levin, March-April 2015 vote, US\$1,100,000

District 34, Council Member Antonio Reynoso, March-April 2015 vote, US\$1,000,000

District 38, Council Member Carlos Menchaca, March-April 2015 vote, US\$2,390,000

District 39, Council Member Brad Lander, March-April 2015 vote, US\$1,395,000

District 44, Council Member David Greenfield, March-April 2015 vote, US\$1,070,000

District 45, Council Member Jumaane Williams, March-April 2015 vote, US\$738,025

District 47, Council Member Mark Treyger, March-April 2015 vote, US\$1,125,000

# PB San Francisco (San Francisco, CA)

District 7, Supervisor Norman Yee, April 2015 vote, US\$188,693

District 10, Supervisor Malia Cohen, April 2015 vote, US\$205,000

## PB San Juan (San Juan, Puerto Rico)

Caimito Neighborhood, Mayor Carmen Yulín Cruz and San Juan Municipal Assembly, September 2014 vote, US\$250,556

Luis Llorens Torres Housing Project, Mayor Carmen Yulín Cruz and San Juan Municipal Assembly, October 2014 vote, US\$244,896

Martín Peña Canal Neighborhoods, Mayor Carmen Yulín Cruz and San Juan Municipal Assembly, December 2014 vote, US\$515,960

Venus Gardens Development, Mayor Carmen Yulín Cruz and San Juan Municipal Assembly, October 2014 vote, US\$268,827

## PB St. Louis (St. Louis, MO)

15th Ward, Alderwoman Megan Ellyia Green, April 2015 vote, US\$97,000

#### PB Vallejo (Vallejo, CA)

City of Vallejo, Vallejo City Council, October 2014 vote, US\$2,442,500

## **CANADA**

## PB Halifax (Halfiax, Nova Scotia)

District 7, Councillor Waye Mason, May 2015 vote, CA\$94,000

District 8, Councillor Jennifer Watts, June 2015 vote, CA\$101,375

## PB Hinton (Hinton, Alberta)

City of Hinton, Mayor Rob Mackin and Hinton Town Council, November 2014 vote, CA\$101,800

# PB Saint-Basile-le-Grand (Saint-Basile-le-Grand, Quebec)

City of Saint-Basile-le-Grand, Mayor Bernard Gagnon and Saint-Basile-le-Grand City Council, October 2014 vote, CA\$200,000

# PB Toronto Community Housing (Toronto, Ontario)

Toronto Community Housing, City of Toronto and Toronto Community Housing, July 2014 vote, CA\$4,711,901

# PB Tofino (Tofino, British Columbia)\*

District of Tofino, Mayor Josie Osborne and District of Tofino Council, April 2015 vote, CA\$25,000

<sup>\*</sup> Denotes a small 2014–15 PB processes that the Public Agenda research team unfortunately only found out about after the analyses were completed and the report written.

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# RELATED PUBLICATIONS

by Public Agenda and Participatory Budgeting Evaluators

# 15 Key Metrics for Evaluating Participatory Budgeting: A Toolkit for Evaluators and Implementers (2015)

Developed by Public Agenda and the Participatory Budgeting Project together with the North American PB Research Board.

This is a toolkit for people interested in evaluating PB efforts in their communities. It is designed to encourage and support some common research goals across PB sites in the U.S. and Canada. As the first iteration of such a toolkit, it focuses on providing practical and realistic guidance for the evaluation of new PB processes.

http://www.publicagenda.org/pages/research-and-evaluation-of-participatory-budgeting-in-the-us-and-canada

# Long Beach Participatory Budgeting Process: Report on the 2014–2015 PB Cycle (2016)

Gary Hytrek and Andres Temblador

The report summarizes findings from the evaluation of Long Beach, California's first fully developed PB process in 2014–15 and two additional pilot PB processes in 2015. Survey data were collected at neighborhood assemblies, at budget delegate meetings and at the vote. Researchers also conducted qualitative interviews throughout the cycle.

 $http://www.pblongbeach.org/uploads/1/3/5/3/13535542/pblb\_final\_report\_cycle\_1\_2014\_2015\_1\_.pdf$ 

# A People's Budget: A Research and Evaluation Report on Participatory Budgeting in New York City (2015)

The Community Development Project at the Urban Justice Center with the PBNYC Research Team

This report shares key findings from the evaluation of New York City's fourth PB cycle (2014–15) and includes recommendations for future PB cycles. The report draws on data from thousands of voter surveys and PB implementation surveys completed by council district staff and delegate committee facilitators.

https://cdp.urbanjustice.org/sites/default/files/CDP.WEB.doc\_Report\_PBNYC\_cycle4findings\_20151021.pdf

# Building a People's Budget: Draft Research and Evaluation Report on the 2013–2014 Participatory Budgeting Process in Chicago (2015)

Thea Crum, Jenny Baker, Eduardo Salinas and Rachel Weber

This report shares findings from the evaluation of Chicago's 2013—14 PB cycle. The research sought to determine who participated in the initiative and why, to assess what new knowledge or skills participants gained as a result of their participation and to evaluate which outreach techniques were most effective in encouraging participation. Researchers administered 2,520 participant surveys and conducted systematic observations in key phases of the process.

The report on Chicago's 2014—15 PB cycle is forthcoming: "Building a People's Budget for Chicago: Evaluation Report on the 2014—2015 Participatory Budgeting Process in Chicago."

https://greatcities.uic.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Building-a-Peoples-Budget-2013-2014-PB-Research-Report.pdf

# Evaluating the Inaugural Participatory Budgeting Process in the City of Cambridge (2014–2015) (2015)

Nada Zohdy

This report utilizes qualitative and quantitative data to comprehensively analyze Cambridge, Massachusett's first-ever experience with PB, in 2014–15. It examines the breadth and depth of resident participation throughout the process.

http://pb.cambridgema.gov/pbcycle1

# Participatory Budgeting in Vallejo: Innovation in Democracy & Community Engagement (2014)

Office of the City Manager

This report summarizes insights from the evaluation of Vallejo, California's first PB cycle (2012–13) by the Vallejo City Council, city staff, members of the PB steering committee and community volunteers. The evaluation focused on the process's success toward reaching three goals: 1) Improve the City of Vallejo. 2) Engage the Community. 3) Transform Democracy.

http://www.ci.vallejo.ca.us/common/pages/DisplayFile.aspx?itemId=65237

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Public Agenda is a nonprofit organization that helps diverse leaders and citizens navigate divisive, complex issues. Through nonpartisan research and engagement, it provides people with the insights and support they need to arrive at workable solutions on critical issues, regardless of their differences. Since 1975, Public Agenda has helped foster progress on higher education affordability, achievement gaps, community college completion, use of technology and innovation, and other higher education issues.

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The Kettering Foundation, established in 1927 by inventor Charles F. Kettering, is a nonprofit, operating foundation that does not make grants but engages in joint research with others. Kettering's primary research question is, what does it take to make democracy work as it should? Kettering's research is conducted from the perspective of citizens and focuses on what people can do collectively to address problems affecting their lives, their communities, and their nation

More information may be found on www.kettering.org.

For more information about this study, visit: http://www.publicagenda.org/pages/public-spending-by-the-people

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